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Summary
This report summarises two pieces of research, one on Irish crop gross margins and
the structure of direct costs for the period 1994-97 and the other on trends in world
cereal prices to 2008 and their influence on the price of cereals in Ireland.
Costs
Direct costs for tillage crops remained relatively constant over 1994-97 for all crops
except potatoes.  The major cause of annual variation in potato production costs was
seed.  For cereal crops, Winter crops had higher costs than Spring ones, mainly due to
the extra cost of fertilizer and crop protection.  The direct costs of Spring barley, the
main Spring cereal were about thirty per cent less than those of Winter wheat, the
main Winter cereal.
Potato direct costs had significant seed and casual labour components.  For sugar beet,
seeds were a relatively minor item but transport costs were significant.
Gross output
The components of gross output for potatoes and sugar beet were yield and price but
for cereals the CAP reforms of 1992 meant that area aid payments had to be added.
Cereal prices rose between 1994 and 1995 due to exceptional conditions on world
markets but they declined in 1996 and 1997 in line with expectations.  Between 1995
and 1997 the price of Spring barley received by farmers declined by 26 per cent and
the price of Winter wheat declined by 33 per cent.  These price falls were
compensated by area aid payments which were paid each year irrespective of market
conditions.  By 1997 area aid payments made up 30 and 39 per cent of the gross
output of  Winter wheat and Spring barley respectively.
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This combination of market returns and direct payments meant that in 1997 the market
based gross margin had diminished to 41 per cent of the total gross margin of Winter
wheat and 31 per cent of that of Spring barley.  The returns from the market had fallen
to an extent where it would be sensible for farmers to examine the possibilities of
reducing input levels.   If worthwhile, this would tend to encourage the production of
Spring crops.
Grain prices
Projections of world grain  prices from three agencies1 were analysed.  This showed
that the world price of milling quality wheat would reach its lowest point in the
1998/99 or 1999/00 seasons and gradually rise thereafter.  The world price of milling
wheat will rise above the present EU intervention price in 1999/00 according to all
three agencies and will be well above the intervention price levels of the Berlin
Agreement, even at the low prices projected for 1998/99.  So milling wheat exports
from the EU will not be constrained by WTO (World Trade Organisation) value or
volume limits and the farm price will be directly related to the world price.
Coarse grain prices, (which for Ireland means barley and feed wheat) will also be
lowest in 1998/99 but were not projected to rise above the present intervention price.
Under the Berlin Agreement, coarse grain prices will probably be above intervention
prices from about 2004 onwards, which will allow unsubsidised and hence
unconstrained exports after that date.
The exchange rate between the Euro and the US dollar is critical to this process.  A
strong US dollar relative to the Euro brings forward the time when WTO constraints
will cease to affect the grain market.
Introduction
This report contains the results of two sets of analyses which are important for the
tillage enterprise.
1.  An analysis of the production costs of the main tillage enterprises in the Republic
of Ireland for the period 1994 to 1997.
2.  The development of cereal prices on the world market and their relationship to
Irish cereal prices over the period 1994 to 2007.
                                                
1 FAPRI, (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute), OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and USDA (United States Department of Agriculture).
3Analysis of production costs, returns and margins of the main tillage
enterprises
Objective
The purpose of this analysis is to show trends in costs and output values for crop
enterprises and the consequent effects on enterprise gross margins.
Data source
The data used comes from the Teagasc National Farm Survey data base.  The averages
used are from the middle range of farms which are part of the comparative analysis
provided for farmers from the National Farm Survey. This data is also used as the
basis for the estimates and projections produced each year for the annual Situation
and Outlook in Agriculture publication. Only farms on soil class 1 are included.  This
removes the effect of soil type on yield but in any case the great majority of farms
growing tillage crops are on this soil type.
This report analyses trends in direct costs, gross output and the consequent changes in
gross margins.
1. Direct Costs
In this analysis, costs refer only to variable costs.  Fixed costs for individual crops are
difficult to determine as so many fixed cost items are shared between them. Fixed
costs are more properly deducted from the whole farm gross margin than from
enterprise gross margins if an estimate of farm profit is required.
Trends in total direct costs for each of the cereal crops as well as potatoes and sugar
beet for the period 1994 to 1997 are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Direct costs for each of the main tillage enterprises 1994 to 1997 (£/acre).
1994 1995 1996 1997
Spring wheat 146 161 146 136
Winter wheat 156 168 173 170
Spring oats 102 114 113 110
Winter oats 124 156 157 140
Spring feeding barley 112 120 116 117
Malting barley 113 121 129 126
Winter barley 134 160 158 160
Potatoes 476 489 572 432
Sugar beet 299 324 330 298
Source: Teagasc National Farm Survey data base.
Note: To convert to cost per hectare(ha), multiply by 2.471
Table 1 shows that winter wheat consistently had the highest costs per acre of any of
the cereal crops.  Spring cereal crops had lower costs than winter ones.
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spring cereal, (spring barley) is illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1:Total direct costs for winter wheat and spring feeding
barley 1994 to 1997 (£/acre)
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The direct costs of cereal production tended to vary slightly over the years studied but
the relative positions of winter and spring crops did not change.
The components of direct costs for winter wheat and spring barley for the years 1994
to 1997 are illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2: Principal components of direct costs for winter wheat
and spring feeding barley 1994 to 1997 (£/acre)
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5The difference in costs is due mainly to differences in expenditure on fertilizer and
chemicals for crop protection.  The extra fertilizer expenditure is mainly for extra
nitrogen which results from having to apply fertilizer in both the autumn and the
spring. Expenditure on seed was also slightly lower for spring barley because of the
greater use of home saved seed and the lower overall seeding rate.   Crop protection
chemicals refer to fungicides, insecticides, and in the case of winter wheat, plant
growth regulators.  Yearly variations in crop protection expenditure are largely
weather related.  The new generation of strobilurin fungicides introduced from about
1996 tend to be more expensive than their predecessors but have compensating yield
enhancing effects.  Apart from this, variation in  expenditure on other items was
remarkably low.  Expenditure per acre on hired machinery tended to be higher for
spring barley than for winter wheat.  This is related to the greater ownership of
machinery on larger farms where most winter wheat is produced.  The savings on
machinery direct costs for winter wheat production are counter balanced by the extra
fixed costs on these farms.
Potatoes and sugar beet
Trends in direct costs for potatoes and sugar beet are shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Trends in direct costs for potatoes and sugar beet 1994 
to 1997 (£/acre)
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The direct costs of potatoes varied considerably over the 1994-97 period.  Sugar beet
direct costs were much more constant.  The causes of the variation in direct costs for
these two crops are analysed in figure 4.
6Figure 4: Principal components of direct costs of potatoes and
sugar beet 1994 to 1997 (£/acre)
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Figure 4 shows that the major source of the different cost structure per acre between
potatoes and sugar beet was the cost of seed.  Not only was the cost of seed potatoes
much greater than that of sugar beet but the variation in cost was greater also.  Potato
seeds or seed potatoes are of course not true seeds and the price of seed is linked to
the price of ware potatoes.  The variation in the cost of seed was caused by changes
in the price of seed and not sowing rate.  Potatoes also incurred casual labour and
other costs that were not associated with sugar beet.  Sugar beet on the other hand
had relatively high transport costs.  These were the costs of taking the beet to the
factory or collection point, which had to be borne by the producer.
Hired machinery and crop protection costs differed between these two crops but were
fairly constant from year to year.
2. Gross output
Gross output for cereals, oilseeds and protein crops is made up of product sales plus
the area aid compensation payments introduced in the CAP reforms of 1992.  Area
aid does not apply to potatoes or sugar beet.
The National Farm Survey data base only includes grain sales as marketable output.
Sales of other items such as straw are not included in the output of cereal enterprises.
The data for average price derived from the National Farm Survey is the total
revenue for sales of grain, potatoes or sugar from a crop enterprise, divided by the
average yield of that crop.
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Average prices
The changes in the average prices (revenue received) for winter wheat and spring
barley over the years 1994 to 1997 are shown in figure 5.
Figure 5:Average prices received for winter wheat and spring 
feeding barley 1994 to 1997 (£/tonne)
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8Area aid
Area aid receipts on farms producing winter wheat and spring barley are plotted in
figure 6.
Figure 6:Area aid receipts for winter wheat and spring feeding 
barley 1994 to 1997 (£/acre)
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This illustrates that while prices were rising from 1994 to 1995, compensation was
rising also.  Although increases in area aid payments ceased in 1995, the aid payments
received on farms in the National Farm Survey increased after this date.  It is not clear
why this should be but it was probably due to greater understanding by farmers of the
payment system and their ability to take better advantage of the payments offered as
they adapted their farming practices.  The revaluation of the Irish pound relative to the
Ecu in 1997 did not affect area aid payments as these were frozen.  The effects on
gross margins of  the price declines of  years after 1995 were mitigated by the steady
payment of area aid.
Area aid was not claimed equally for winter wheat and spring barley.   Virtually all of
the area aid payment was claimed for the winter wheat enterprise but full payment was
not always claimed for spring barley.  This indicates that spring barley may have been
grown on ineligible land.  It may have been the case that only the area required under
the simplified scheme was claimed for as this would have obviated the need for set-
aside on some farms.
The decline in prices after 1995 means that the proportion of gross output accounted
for by area aid has increased.  This is true for all cereals.  The proportion of area aid in
gross output is higher in crops with lower yields. The amounts and proportions of
market returns and area aid in the gross output for winter wheat and spring barley are
shown in figures 7 and 8.
9Figure 7: Components of gross output for winter wheat 1994 to 1997
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Figure 8: Components of gross output for Spring feeding barley 1994 to 1997
 (£ per acre) (per cent in brackets)
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The relatively greater importance of area aid in spring barley production is clear.  The
proportion of gross output accounted for by area aid varied between 28 and 39 per
cent since 1995 (the first year of full area aid).  Figure 8 shows that this increased
proportion was due to a decrease in the value of market returns due largely to reduced
price and also to a greater take up of area aid payments by producers.
A similar situation prevailed for winter wheat, except that the higher yields of this
crop meant that the area aid portion of gross output was smaller.
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This implies that as prices fall and direct aid payments become a greater part of gross
output, spring crops will become relatively more attractive.  This is because of their
lower risk and lower input requirement than winter crops.  As well as lower levels of
physical inputs, spring crops such as spring barley also tend to require less skill and
less time.  This will become more important as more and more farms become part-
time.
Deducting the direct costs which were analysed in section 1 from the output (both
with and without compensation) gives the gross margins which are discussed in
section 3.
3. Gross margins
The introduction of area payments for cereals, proteins and oilseeds, provides the
rationale for two analyses of gross margins.  The first is the analysis of the total gross
margin, (gross output less direct costs) including arable area aid payments.  The
second is the market based gross margin which includes returns from the market
only and does not include area aid payments.
Total gross margins
Gross margins for each of the crops over the period 1994 to 1997 are shown in table 2.
Table 2: Gross margins of major crop enterprises 1994 to 1997 (£ per acre)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Spring wheat 174 296 232 191
Winter wheat 237 334 288 213
Spring oats 129 185 165 132
Winter oats 203 231 176 190
Spring feeding barley 145 207 198 156
Malting barley 162 260 236 172
Winter barley 219 241 229 166
Potatoes 1066 725 448 783
Sugar beet 321 309 341 314
Source: Teagasc National Farm Survey data base.
Note: To calculate margins per hectare(ha), multiply by 2.471
Gross margins for the tillage crops shown in table 1 are best divided into two (cereals
and non cereals) for the purposes of analysis.  Cereals should be separated from the
others since (i) they are subject to a separate support system and (ii) the other crops
may be grown independently or form a break in the cereal rotation.
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Cereals
Table 2 shows that of the cereals, winter wheat consistently had the highest gross
margin.  This was due to its higher yield and the better response of  yield to inputs
than the other cereals.  The greater take up of area aid payments by winter wheat
producers also contributed to this.  Except for malting barley which is a spring crop,
winter cereals had higher gross margins than spring ones, again due to higher yields.
The tables of gross margins also show the effects of  increased direct payments in
1995, when the area aid payment increased by 23 per cent from 35 to 45 Ecu per
tonne.
The trends of gross margins for the three main cereal enterprises are illustrated in
figure 9.
Figure 9: Gross margins for malting barley, winter wheat and
spring feeding barley 1994 to 1997 (£/acre)
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The increase in gross margins caused by the increase in both cereal prices and
compensation payments for the 1995 harvest is clear.  In 1995, cereal producers
received a double bonus from both prices and area aid.  In subsequent years the gross
margin declined as cereal prices declined but was nevertheless supported by continued
payment of arable area aid.
Potatoes and sugar beet
Sugar beet and potatoes had much higher gross margins than cereals but they are not
directly comparable with cereals since their fixed costs are much greater.  The gross
margin per acre for potatoes also illustrates the volatility of the margin from this
enterprise.  Potato yields fluctuate greatly due to weather conditions and this, along
with variations in acreage planted leads to large variations in price, which in turn
causes the gross margin to change.  There is no institutional management of the potato
market to inhibit the operation of these market forces.
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Trends in prices for potatoes and sugar beet are shown in figure 10.
Figure 10: Average price of potatoes and sugar beet 1994 to 1997 
(£/tonne)
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Trends in gross margins for potatoes and sugar beet are shown in figure 11.
Figure 11: Gross margins of potatoes and sugar beet 1994 to 1997 
(£/acre)
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Market based gross margins
Trends in market based gross margins, are shown in table 3.
Table 3:Market based gross margins 1994 to 1997 (£ per acre)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Spring wheat 91 187 129 76
Winter wheat 161 232 178 100
Spring oats 67 104 90 46
Winter oats 124 126 67 71
Spring feeding barley 70 114 104 49
Malting barley 81 158 127 55
Winter barley 138 143 119 56
Potatoes 1066 725 448 783
Sugar beet 321 309 341 314
Source: Teagasc National Farm Survey data base.
Note: To convert to margins per hectare(ha), multiply by 2.471
Looking at market based gross margins, ie leaving out area aid payments, the cereal
crop with the highest gross margin was again winter wheat, due largely to its higher
yield.
For cereals, the market based gross margin is much less than the total gross margin
including area aid.  Therefore it should make economic sense for producers to reduce
input levels.  Other things being equal this would encourage a trend towards the
growing of spring cereal crops.
Conclusions
The structure of the direct costs of the major cereal crops is relatively constant from
year to year.  Variations are minor and often depend on weather related factors.
The uptake of arable area aid depends on the crop.  The full amount of area aid was
never taken up. This was particularly true for spring barley.  Many producers probably
only claimed for the simplified system in order to avoid having set-aside some
eligible land.
The cost structure of potatoes and sugar beet is quite different from that of cereals.  In
the case of potatoes, the cost of seed is a very significant and highly variable cost
item.  In projecting the costs of production for potatoes therefore, particular attention
must be paid to this item and its prediction.
For sugar beet, the cost items are relatively constant and it is easier to make
predictions that are more accurate than for potatoes where the price of seed varies
significantly from year to year.
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Projections of grain prices
Objective
This section discusses the implications of some long-term projections for cereal
prices,  particularly in relation to their impact on EU and Irish prices.
Long term price trends for cereals
Projections of longer term price trends for cereals, as far as 2008/9 in one case, have
been made by a variety of organisations including OECD, FAPRI and the USDA.
(OECD 1998, FAPRI 1999 and USDA 1998).  The forecasts of the OECD and FAPRI
use relatively similar methodologies and data sources and the OECD has the
reputation of being more cautious.  These projections are assessments of what is
expected to happen under a particular set of assumptions if no changes in policy occur
and weather conditions are normal.  They are not predictions of  the future but they
do provide a view of the future if policies are not changed.  None of the projections
referred to here take account of the effects of the Berlin Agreement on reform of the
CAP.
World cereal markets
At the world level there are two main cereal markets.  These are the markets for food
grains, essentially wheat and rice, much of which is destined for human consumption
and the market for coarse or feed grains, which includes cereals other than wheat
and rice.  The coarse grains, which are mainly maize and barley are mainly used for
animal feed.
15
Wheat
The projections available for the world wheat price of OECD, USDA and FAPRI at
April 1999 are summarized in figure 12.
Figure 12: 'World' wheat price 1996/97 to 2008/09
 (US$ per tonne)
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Since wheat is not a perfectly homogeneous commodity, there is no such thing as a
world price.  The prices that are quoted are the prices for wheat of particular types at
particular locations.  In the projections shown in figure 12, the OECD price is the
fob(free on board or export) price for Argentine Trigo Pan hard wheat.  The FAPRI
price is for No 2 US Hard Red Winter wheat fob Gulf Ports.  The USDA price is not
an export price but is the average price received by farmers across the United States.
This includes types of wheat that are both more and less valuable than Hard Red
Winter wheat.  A transport and handling charge would have to be added to the USDA
price to give an fob price.  Consequently the USDA price tends to be below the other
two.
A further point about these projections is that they are produced at different times of
the year and the data they use, especially macro economic projections, change as time
moves along.  For example, the FAPRI estimates were able to take more account of
the Asian and Russian economic difficulties than the other projections which were
made earlier.
The main feature of the projections shown in figure 12 is that all three agencies
project a fall in wheat prices from 1996/97 to low points in the present 1998/99
season.  After this point, the wheat price is expected to rise slowly.
The relationship between the world price for wheat and the present (1998/99) and post
2000 intervention prices is shown in figure 13.  The intervention prices shown are
those decided at the Berlin Council of the EU on March 24-25, 1999.
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Figure 13: 'World' wheat price 1996/97 to 2008/09
 (US$ per tonne)
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The present EU intervention price (119.19 Euro or 129.92 US$ per tonne at an
exchange rate of  1 Euro equal to 1.09 US$) is shown as the uppermost of the three
horizontal lines in figure 13.  When the new intervention price, arrived at in two steps
is added it is clear that the world price will be above the EU intervention price from
the year 2000 onwards even under the most pessimistic outlook.   This will obviate the
need for export refunds.
The world price which EU exporters would face under these conditions will be
above the levels shown in figures 11 and 12 as transport costs need to be added to the
fob prices.   The size of the transport costs will depend on the market being served.
A rough guide is that freight rates from the US Gulf ports to North Africa which is the
major market for bread wheat of the types quoted has varied between 20 and 40 US
dollars per tonne over the 1994 to 1999 period.  From the EU, the rate has been about
15 to  20 US dollars per tonne from Rotterdam to North Africa.
Importance of exchange rates
The relationship between world and intervention prices is very much dependent on the
exchange rate between the Euro, which is what intervention price is expressed in and
the US dollar, the currency used for world trade in cereals.  A strengthening of the
dollar against the Euro, ie when one Euro will buy less dollars, will lead to a lowering
of the intervention price in dollar terms.  Since the gap between the intervention price
and the world price is roughly equal to the export refund, a strengthening of the dollar
against the Euro would bring forward the time when the world wheat price would
equal the intervention price and therefore reduce expenditure export refunds. A
weakening of the dollar on the other hand will delay the time when the world price
will equal the intervention price.  This will lead to problems with the undertakings
given under the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) and a build up of intervention
stocks.
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Coarse grains
From Irelands point of view, the coarse grains market is more important than the
milling wheat market, since most Irish produced cereals are used for animal feed.
Although it is not strictly a coarse grain, feed wheat forms part of this market.
The projections of FAPRI, OECD and USDA for coarse grains are shown in figure 14.
Figure 14: World coarse grain price  1996/97 to 2008/09
  (US$ per tonne)
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These projections show a similar shape to those for wheat prices.  All three agencies
project that the coarse grain price will reach a low point in 1998/99 (FAPRI and
OECD) or 1999/00 (USDA) and then rise gradually.  The reference prices used are the
price of US No 2 Corn fob Gulf by FAPRI and OECD and the ex-farm price of corn
of various types by the USDA.
The present and future intervention prices may be superimposed on figure 14 in the
same way as was done for wheat prices.  This is shown in figure 15.
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Figure 15: World coarse grain price  1996/97 to 2008/09 and
intervention price  (US$ per tonne)
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Figure 15 shows a larger gap between the world and intervention price than is likely in
practice since the major coarse grain produced in the EU is barley which often trades
at a slight premium to maize.  Also, to reach the EU (Rotterdam) price a transport cost
of about 13 US$ per tonne should be added to the fob Gulf price.
The present (1999) EU intervention price and is likely therefore to stay above the
projected world price for coarse grain until at least the end of the projection period
according to the FAPRI projections.  Under this scenario the intervention price will
form the basis of the farm-gate price for feed grains (including feed wheat) within the
EU and consequently within Ireland.  In this case the restrictions agreed under the
URA on the levels of export subsidies become very important as they limit the
possibilities for selling off the intervention stocks that are bound to build up unless
set-aside is increased to very high levels.
If the projections hold true, the new intervention price, (agreed on 25 March 1999),
which is scheduled to be introduced in two steps starting in 2000/01 will remain
above the FAPRI projection of the world price until about 2007 or 2004 if transport
costs are taken into account.  This means that the EU price for feed grains will be
determined by the intervention price until about 2004 according to the FAPRI
projections but not according to the OECD projections which were made using rather
more optimistic assumptions about the level of demand for feed grains.  It is difficult
to know how quickly the demand for feed grains will return to the level prevailing
before the Asian and Russian financial crises.
The exchange rate between the US dollar and the Euro is very critical to all this
analysis.  A relative strengthening of the dollar to, say, 1.00 Euro per dollar would
ensure that the projections for the grain price would be comfortably above the new
intervention price which would then be 101 US$ per tonne.
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Implications
It seems likely that for milling wheat, farmers will be receiving world prices after the
introduction of the new CAP reforms.  This will not be a great change as this is
already happening in many instances.
For feed grains, the implications are not so clear cut.  If there is a recovery in world
prices for coarse grains, then it seems that by the year 2004, even according to the
FAPRI forecasts, which are presently the most pessimistic, the new intervention price
will be at or below the world price, (at least as measured at Rotterdam).  This will
mean that the URA limits will not be breached and the EU will be able to export grain
without subsidies and the aim of the policy change will have been achieved.  If this
does not occur, further downward revisions of the intervention price will become
necessary if intervention stocks are not to accumulate.
Reliance on world prices by cereal producers will mean increased volatility in cereal
prices caused by the lack of an intervention price and reduced stock levels.  This
situation has already been experienced by farmers in the USA following the
introduction of the 1996 Agriculture Act, (the FAIR Act).  Under the terms of this
Act, US cereal producers now receive world prices plus a direct payment which is not
coupled to their level of cereal production.
The increased volatility of cereal prices will improve the market for risk reducing
instruments such as insurance schemes, and trading in futures and options.
Conclusions
The price for wheat of milling or bread making quality in Ireland will be above the
intervention price and will be governed by trends in world prices from 1999 onwards.
The price of barley will be below the intervention price, (meaning the post Berlin
Agreement price) until about 2004 and will be governed by world prices after that.
The date at which the world price for coarse grains rises above the EU intervention
price will be very dependent on the exchange rate between the Euro and the US dollar.
A weakening of the Euro against the US dollar will bring the date forward and a
strengthening will extend it.
References
FAPRI, January 1999 presentations on www.fapri.missouri.edu.
OECD, The Agricultural Outlook 1998-2003. Paris.OECD.
USDA. www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/baseline.
